On the day before 28 January 2019 (the accident)
a different crew, also arriving at Tuscaloosa, had similarly experienced an indication that the nosegear
had not deployed. The crew sought vectoring to delay the arrival and ran through the abnormal situations checklist, but the event was not written up in the maintenance log after the jet landed. In contrast, its captain said that he had informed the captain of the incident flight of the gear indication issues.

On 28 January 2019, the captain called for a “flap 15” configuration and deployment of the landing-gear.

A dip from normal pressure, it says, the hydraulic
system might not be able to unlock the nose-gear.

a gearwarning horn sounded and was acknowledged by the crew, multiple “sink rate” and “pull up” warnings came on as well.

But the captain appears to have ignored these warnings.

The flight engineer stated that he had recommended the gear be recycled, but that the captain declined, while the first officer stated that he recommended a goaround to troubleshoot the problems, which the captain also declined.

• captain ignored multiple alerts and warnings
• Incomplete logbook/maintenance log report